2. Reason

It is often the case that when disputes arise over knowledge claims, what is at issue is not only the substance or facts of the matter, but also the logic or reasons given for acceptance of the facts, and the procedures used in reaching a conclusion. The questions in this section probe the nature, value and limits of reason, and the techniques associated with the logical rigour that many suppose is a shared standard of evaluation.

A. Nature of Reason

1. What constitutes 'good reason' and 'good arguments'? What is the value of learning to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments?
2. What constitutes a 'good reason' for belief? Is a persuasive reason necessarily grounded in truth?
3. How accurate is the definition of logic as the study of form in argument, irrespective of the subject matter. Is this form/content distinction found in other Ways of Knowing or Areas of Knowledge?
4. Does the nature of reason vary across cultures?
5. Does knowledge always require some kind of rational basis?
6. If knowledge claims cannot be rationally defended, or can be shown to be irrational, should they be renounced?

B. Limitations of Reason

1. Why are informal fallacies often plausible and convincing? When, where, and how can they be formulated?
2. How do beliefs affect the capacity to reason logically and the capacity to recognize valid arguments? How do they affect the capacity to recognize fallacies and rationalization?
3. What, if any, are the advantages of expressing arguments in symbolic terms (for example, p^q)? Are the ambiguity and vagueness of conventional language eliminated by this formulation?
4. If logic puzzles are formulated in highly contrived terms, such as 'liars' and 'truth-tellers', do such formulations diminish or emphasize the relevance and role of logic as a useful tool to demonstrate a point?
5. In what ways can the person presenting an argument and the context in which it is made influence its acceptance or rejection?
6. In everyday discourse, the 'rational' choice is usually equated with the 'best' choice. Does this conjunction hold in all social contexts?

C. Linking Questions

1. What may be meant by André Gide's comment that 'What eludes logic is the most precious element in us, and one can draw nothing from a syllogism that the mind has not put there in advance'?
2. What role does formal logic play in arriving at, and justifying knowledge? How does this role compare with the roles of the other Ways of Knowing? Does the role of formal logic affect the degree of certainty in, or the social status of, the various Areas of Knowledge?
3. Is it correct to think that what constitutes a good reason varies from discipline to discipline and from culture to culture? What are the implications of the answer to this question when disputes arise among practitioners and between cultures?
4. Attempts have been made to identify universal, self-evident and incontrovertible 'laws of logic'. The 'law of identity' (for example, 'an apple is an apple') or the 'law of non-contradiction' (for example, 'nothing can be an apple and also a non-apple'). Are these actually 'laws' in the scientific sense of the term, or are they 'axioms'? How do they compare with axioms in mathematics, and with foundational, underlying beliefs we take for granted in other Areas of Knowledge?